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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KOREA: LEGALLY COPING 
WITH PAST WRONGS AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION 
Kuk Cho† 
Abstract: For more than a decade, Korean society has taken various legal steps to 
rectify past wrongs perpetrated by the old authoritarian-military regime.  In 1995, the 
“Special Act Concerning the May 18 Democratization Movement” was passed in the 
National Assembly.  Under this new legal circumstance, the two former presidents were 
imprisoned on charges of leading the 1979 military coup and brutally oppressing the May 
18 Uprising of 1980.  However, because such a transition from the authoritarian-military 
rule was established through a political compromise, Korean society had to experience a 
limited transitional justice.  As another step to rectify past wrongs, the “Act for Restoring 
the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for 
Them” was enacted in 2000.  Under this Act, a number of democratization activists have 
been recognized as “democratization movement involvers.”  However, this Act has been 
strongly criticized because the activists using harsh counter-violence were also 
recognized as the “involvers.”  In 2001, the legislature enacted the “Special Act for 
Truth-Finding Suspicious Deaths” to handle the suspicious deaths of many 
democratization activists during the old authoritarian-military regime.  Also, broadening 
the scope of illustrating past wrongs, a series of laws was recently enacted to uncover the 
activities of pro-Japanese collaborators under the Japanese occupation in the early 
twentieth century. 
These various Special Acts for dealing with past wrongs certainly have never been 
free from political struggle between the liberal and conservative.  Some argue that these 
acts were forged by agreements between these two factions.  However, although each 
side has advocated somewhat differently, they have come together in the belief that 
Korean society needs to discard the legacy of the authoritarian regime.  In this light, the 
acts are symbolic statements that officially declare the people’s dissatisfaction with the 
authoritarian regime.  Therefore, they are necessary for Koreans to heal old wounds, and 
to move beyond their tortured past. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade, Korean society has taken legal steps to rectify 
past wrongs under the authoritarian-military regime.  A cleansing campaign 
has developed since the “Civilian Government” was launched in 1993.  It 
was a part of a global wave of political democratization after soviet 
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He received an LL.B. in 1986 and an LL.M. in 1989 from Seoul National University College of Law; an 
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communism’s collapse.1  The nationwide “June Struggle” of 1987 led to the 
collapse of Korea’s authoritarian-military regime and opened a road toward 
democratization.  Since then, a number of human rights violation cases were 
shockingly revealed in Korea (“Korea” or “South Korea”).  The Korean 
public came to see the whole picture of the painful past, and it became an 
unavoidable task for the Korean democratic-civilian governments to rectify 
past wrongs.  How to properly achieve “transitional justice” has become a 
serious political and legal issue.2  While liberals including human rights 
organizations supported the realization of transitional justice, conservatives, 
in particular politicians with military backgrounds, objected to it. 
This Article aims to review the legislative steps and the judicial 
decisions regarding Korea’s dark past, and to provide a Korean method to 
deal with past wrongs.  First, this article reviews the constitutionality of the 
1995 Special Act Regarding the May 18 Democratic Movement, which was 
enacted to suspend the statute of limitations in order to punish the crimes 
committed by military leaders on and around December 12, 1979 and May 
18, 1980.  Second, this article proceeds to examine the recent laws excluding 
application of the statute of limitations to state crimes against human rights 
and related issues of retrospective punishment.  Third, it reviews two bills 
intended to restore the honor of democratization activists, and to find the 
truth about suspicious deaths that occurred in the process of the 
democratization movement against the authoritarian-military regime:  the 
2004 Act for Restoring the Honor of the Democratization Contributors and 
Compensation for Their Sacrifice, and the 2000 Special Acts for Finding 
Truth about Suspicious Deaths.  Finally, to extend the scope for rectification 
of past wrongs, this article briefly examines three recently enacted laws:  the 
2004 Special Act for Finding the Truth of Anti-Nation Activities under the 
Japanese Occupation, the 2005 Special Act for Reverting the Property of 
Those Who Did Pro-Japanese Anti-Nation Activities to State, and the 2005 
Basic Law for Coping with Past History for Truth and Reconciliation. 
                                           
1
  Regarding the global situation of lustration of the past wrongs, see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (A. James McAdams ed. 1997); Mark S. Ellis, Purging the Past: 
The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 
181 (1997); THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES (Alexandra 
Barahona de Brito et al. eds., 2001). 
2
  “Transitional justice” is defined as the conception of justice associated with periods of political 
change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes. 
See Guillermo O'Donnel & Phillippe C. Schmitter, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE  
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 6 (1998); Ruti G. Teitel, Transtional Justice Genealogy, 
16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003). 
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II. TWO FORMER PRESIDENTS WERE PUNISHED  
A. Punishing the Leaders of the Military Coup3 
1. The Civilian Government Was Initially Hesitant to Punish Military 
Leaders 
The task of coping with past wrongs started with the punishment of 
military leaders, including two former presidents, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh 
Tae-Woo.  They led the December military coup of 1979 after the 
assassination of President Park Chung-Hee, and ordered the brutal 
oppression of the May 18 Uprising of 1980 in the Kwangju area.  Chun 
became President after dissolving the National Assembly and revising the 
Constitution under martial law.  Roh was elected as president by popular 
referendum in 1987. 
The “Civilian Government” that President Kim Young-Sam launched 
in 1993 faced strong demands from the public to investigate and punish 
these military leaders.  Under the previous Roh government, redefining the 
Uprising as a “democratization movement,” the National Assembly passed a 
law that allowed for victim compensation,4  and made Chun appear and 
testify in parliamentary hearings.  However, these efforts did not alleviate 
the people’s demands for justice and a full inquiry into the two historical 
incidents.  In its inception, the Kim Young-Sam government was hesitant to 
pursue punishment against the two former presidents because he entered the 
Blue House with support from many politicians with military origins.  
Although President Kim strongly criticized the military leaders and praised 
the May 18 Uprising of 1980, he was reluctant to resort to criminal 
punishment, "arguing that the truth should be reserved for historical 
judgment in the future."5 
In 1994, the Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office made a controversial 
decision to suspend prosecution of the military leaders although it 
recognized that the December coup of 1979 involved crimes of mutiny, 
insurrection, and murder, and the suppression of the May 18 Uprising of 
                                           
3
  See generally James West, Martial Lawlessness: The Legal Aftermath of Kwangju, 6 PAC.RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 85 (1998); In Sup Han, Kwangju and Beyond: Coping with Past State Atrocities in South Korea, 
27 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 998 (2005). 
4
  Kwangju minjuhwa undong kwanryeonja bosang deung e kwanhan beopryul [Act for 
Compensation for the Victims in the Democratization Movement in Kwangju], Statutes of S. Korea, Law 
No. 4266 of 1990) (last revised by Law No. 7911 of 2006). 
5
  Han, supra note 3, at 1005. 
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1980 constituted treason and murder.  They were concerned that prosecuting 
the military leaders might cause political, social, and legal confusion 
because, legally speaking, the democratic-civilian government was a legal 
successor to the previous Chun and Roh governments.  Therefore, they 
concluded that “a victorious coup should not be punished after a substantial 
lapse of time.”6  The office was faced with a “dilemma between formal 
legality and substantive justice, or between normative reality and a 
normative ideal.”7 
In 1995, the majority opinion of the Constitutional Court held that this 
prosecutorial decision did not exceed the prosecutorial discretion allotted in 
Article 247 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and was, hence, 
constitutional.8  The court held that the statute of limitations automatically 
ceases during the incumbencies of the former presidents according to Article 
84 of the Constitution.9  Article 84 provides:  “The President shall not be 
charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of office except for 
insurrection or treason.”10  This meant that Chun and Roh could be subject to 
prosecution for mutiny or homicide.  However, the court believed that it did 
not need to intervene into the prosecutorial decision, considering the 
conflicting interests between realizing justice by punishing the military 
leaders, and prolonged social confrontation caused by doing so.11 
2. The 1995 Special Act Regarding the May 18 Democratization 
Movement Presented a Legislative Move to Punish the Perpetrators 
The Korean public was not satisfied with this compromised legal 
solution and kept pressing the government and the legislature to make a new 
law to punish the military leaders.  Students demonstrated in the street 
demanding punishment of Chun and Roh.  The newly revealed scandal that 
the two former presidents had amassed huge amounts of money from bribes 
they had received during their presidency made people even more infuriated.  
It became certain that Korean people did not want to leave their crimes to 
the judgment of history but to seek a legal response to the crimes.  In 
response, President Kim directed his ruling party to enact new legislation 
                                           
6
  5.18 beop jeok chaekim kwa yeoksa cheok chaekim [MAY 18, LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
HISTORICAL EVALUATION], 225-27, 243-44 (Park Eun-Jung & Han In-Sup eds. 1995). 
7
  Han, supra note3, at 1010. 
8
  Decision of January 20, 1995, 94 HunMa 246 (Korean Constitutional Court).  See also Decision of 
December 15, 1995, 95 HunMa 221, 95 HunMa 233, 95 HunMa 297 (Korean Constitutional Court). 
9
  Decision of January 20, 1995, 94 HunMa 246 (Korean Constitutional Court) at 5-Ka-(2)-(Da). 
10
  See Daehan minguk heonbeop [The CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], art. 84 (last 
amended 1987), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome01.jsp. 
11
  Decision of January 20, 1995, 94 HunMa 246, supra note, 8 at 5-Da. 
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and the National Assembly passed the Special Act Concerning the May 18 
Democratization Movement in December 1995.12 
The Special Act was enacted to suspend the statute of limitations for 
the crimes against constitutional order which had been committed on and 
around December 12, 1979 and May 18, 1980. 13   It stipulated that the 
limitation period ceased to run during the period of the presidencies of Chun 
and Roh in which “there existed obstacles for the State to institute 
prosecution.”14  It also allowed the court to review prosecutorial disposition 
of cases where a prosecutor had declined to prosecute.15  On the other hand, 
a right to have a special retrial was given to people who had been punished 
because of their engagement in the May 18 Uprising or because of their 
opposition to crimes against the constitutional order.16 
In these new legal circumstances, the Seoul District Prosecutor’s 
Office initiated prosecution and detained the two former presidents and 
former high-ranking officials who led the 1979 military coup and oppressed 
the May 18 Uprising of 1980. 
B.  Judicial Decisions Allowed the Case to Go Forward 
During the trial, the constitutionality of the 1995 Special Act was 
challenged by the defense.  The defense argued that the Special Act was 
made to punish only specific groups, and, therefore, arbitrarily violated the 
equal protection principle.  In addition, it applied retrospective punishment 
and, thus, violated the ex post facto principle.  However, the Constitutional 
Court confirmed the constitutionality of Article 2 of the Special Act in 
1996.17 
First, the Constitutional Court held that the Special Act cannot be 
regarded as automatically unconstitutional even though it was narrowly 
created for particular situations.  The Special Act can be justified by other 
reasonable grounds:  that the unlawfulness of the coup was grave and there 
exists national demand to rectify the past wrongs in the aim of establishing 
legitimate constitutionalism.18 
Second, the court held that the Special Act does not violate the ex post 
facto principle.  The court based its decision on two hypothetical situations 
                                           
12
  5.18 Kwangju minjuhwa undong deung e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act Concerning 
the May 18 Democratization Movement], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 5029 of 1995. 
13
  Id. art. 2(1). 
14
  Id. 
15
  Id. art. 3. 
16
   Id. art. 4. 
17
  Decision of February 16, 1996, 96 HunKa 2, 96 HunBa 7 & 13 (Korean Constitutional Court). 
18
  Id. at 3-Ka-(3). 
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because the Supreme Court at that time had not decided the issue of whether 
the statute of limitations expired when the Special Act was applicable.  It 
held that if the statute of limitations had not expired it would be 
constitutional to extend the statute of limitations.  The justices’ opinions 
were split in the case as to whether the statute had already expired.19  Four 
justices maintained the Special Act was still constitutional, while five 
justices argued it was unconstitutional. 20   However, the vote of five 
dissenting justices did not meet the requirement for a decision of 
unconstitutionality, which requires a vote of six or more. 
On April 17, 1997, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendants’ 
convictions for treason and killing for the purpose of treason. 21   The 
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for the crimes against 
constitutional order was lawfully suspended by the Special Act, and the 
prosecution was instituted before the period expired.22  It held: 
The defendants grasped political power after they stopped the 
exercise of the authority of constitutional state institutions by 
mutiny and rebellion.  Even if they had arguably ruled the State 
based on the Constitution which was revised by popular 
referendum, it should not be overlooked that a new legal order 
was established by mutiny and rebellion.  It cannot be tolerated 
under any circumstances under our constitutional order to stop 
the exercise of the authority of constitutional state institutions 
and grasp political power by violence, not following democratic 
procedure.  Therefore, the mutiny and rebellion can be 
punishable.23 
Chun was sentenced to life imprisonment and Roh was imprisoned for 
seventeen years.  Others received prison sentences ranging from three and a 
half to eight years.  Based on Article 7 of the Special Act,24 the decorations 
given to the military leaders were cancelled in 2006.25 
                                           
19
  Id. at 3-Da & Ra. 
20
  Id. at 3-Na. 
21
  Decision of April 17, 1997, 96 Do 3376 (Korean Supreme Court). 
22
  Id. chapt. 1 (2)-Ka. 
23
  Id. chapt. 1 (1). 
24
  5.18 Kwangju minjuhwa undong deung e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act Concerning 
the May 18 Democratization Movement], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 5029 of 1995, art. 7. 
25
  Park Joong-Hyun, [Disgraced Ex-Presidents Lose State Honors], CHOSUN ILBO (S. Korea), Mar. 
22, 2006; Sung Dong-Ki, [Former Presidents Stripped of Medals], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Mar. 22, 
2006; Kim Hak-Joon, [The Decorations Awarded to Former Presidents Canceled] HANKYOREH SHINMOON 
(S. Korea), Mar. 21, 2006; Chun Su-jin, [Ex-Presidents Stripped of All Decorations, Orders of Merit], 
JOONG-ANG ILBO (S. Korea), Mar. 22, 2006. 
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C.  The Successful Prosecution and Trial Were “Collective Lessons in 
Justice” 
Transitional justice in Korea did not sacrifice justice although the Kim 
Young-Sam government was established with support from many politicians 
with military origins.  The government had to consider the people’s power 
that overthrew the old regime.  The trial of the military leaders declared that 
military coups and dictatorships will never be tolerated in Korea.  It was a 
symbolic break with the old regime, providing education about democracy 
and the rule of law.  In this context, the trial of the military leaders was a 
“political theatre” to provide “collective lessons in justice.”26 
After the guilty verdict, the military leaders, including two former 
presidents, received presidential pardons and were released in 1997.  
Nobody expected they would fully serve their sentence.  Investigation and 
prosecution for other inferior soldiers or government officials who served 
for them were not pursued.  The fact that the transition from the 
authoritarian-military regime was not established through revolution, but 
rather through compromise, embracing some parts of the political forces that 
had backed the authoritarian-military regime, constituted the restrictive 
surroundings for transitional justice.  In this sense, justice was limited. 
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS CAN PREVENT THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAWS 
A. There Are Legal Difficulties When Punishing State Crimes Because of 
Statutes of Limitations 
Although two former presidents and other former military leaders 
were punished, a number of governmental officials or agents who tortured 
citizens, distorted substantial facts to convict citizens, and even murdered 
citizens, remain unpunishable.  The Presidential Truth Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths, which was established in 2001, 27  recognized their 
crimes.  However, they were not prosecuted because the given period in the 
statute of limitations had expired.  According to the Criminal Procedure 
Code, crimes such as murder are subject to statutory limitations of only 
                                           
26
  Barahona, supra note 1, at 26. 
27
  Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of 
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of 2005).  
Regarding the activities of the Truth Commission, see text accompanying notes 80-91. 
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fifteen years. 28   This short period of statutory limitation is a major 
impediment to legal redress. 
Besides the “suspicious death”29 cases that occurred in the process of 
the democratization movement, there was a notorious case where state 
authorities hid and supported a killer in order to maintain an anti-communist 
ideology and to bolster the authoritarian regime. 
Kim Ok-Boon, also known as Susie Kim, was killed in Hong Kong by 
her husband in 1987.  Her husband, Yoon Tae-Sik, lied to law enforcement 
authorities including the Agency for National Security Planning (“ANSP”), 
which was formerly the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (“KCIA”), that 
she was a spy for North Korea, had kidnapped him with other spies, and that 
he had escaped from them.  Even though they found Yoon to be lying, the 
ANSP announced that Kim was a spy and praised Yoon as an anti-
communist fighter.  In 2001, after democratization, the truth was revealed 
and Yoon was arrested and convicted.  In May 2002, Kim’s family filed a 
civil suit against the state and, in August 2003, was given 4.2 billion won 
(equivalent to approximately 0.4 million U.S. dollars) as compensation in a 
court decision.  The Seoul District Court held that the state cannot rely on 
the statute of limitations if it has not taken any action to correct the illegal 
activities by state authorities.30 
However, the ANSP agents who fabricated and concealed the truth 
could not be prosecuted because the statute of limitations period for their 
crimes had expired.  The public was angered by such legal technicalities 
preventing the punishment of criminals.  Civic organizations and human 
rights groups strongly argued for the establishment of a law to prosecute 
them.  However, like American jurisprudence,31  the majority of Korean 
jurisprudence maintains that retrospective application of an amended 
limitation period to time-barred prosecution violates the ex post facto 
principle because it may invite arbitrary and oppressive exercise of state 
authority to punish and infringes upon the citizen’s expectation of being free 
                                           
28
 Hyeongsa sosongbeop [The Korean Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Statutes of S. Korea, 
art. 249. (1954) (last revised by Law No. 7965 of 2006). 
29
  Id. art. 2. 
30
  Kim Soo-Kyung, [4.2 Billion Won Paid to Suzy Kim’s Family], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Aug. 15, 
2003; Yang Sung-Wook, [Suzy Kim’s Family Won the Lawsuit Against the Government] DONG-A ILBO (S. 
Korea), Aug. 15, 2003. 
31
  Commonwealth v. Guimento, 491 A.2d 166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); People v. Shedd, 702 P.2d 267 
(Colo. 1985); State v. Hodgson, 740 P.2d 848 (Wash. 1987); State v. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 
1988); State v. Nunn, 768 P.2d 268 (Kan. 1989); Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 524 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 
1989); Commonwealth v. Rocheleau, 533 N.E.2d 1333 (Mass. 1989); People v. Chesebro, 463 N.W.2d 134 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Cookman, 920 P.2d. 1086 (Or. 1996). 
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from punishment.  By contrast, extending a limitation period before a given 
prosecution is barred does not violate this principle.32 
As seen in the decision of the Constitutional Court on the 
constitutionality of the 1995 Special Act Concerning the May 18 
Democratization Movement in December 1995, 33  Constitutional Court 
justices’ opinions were also split on whether the retrospective extension of 
the statute of limitations was constitutional when the limitation period had 
already expired. 
B. Legislative Efforts to Overcome Statute of Limitations Bars to 
Prosecutions 
There have been two bills submitted to cease or exclude the 
application of the statute of limitations. 
The first was the 2002 Bill for Revision of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. 34   It excluded the application of the statute of limitations to the 
following crimes:  treason, inducing of foreign invasion, killing or inflicting 
injury by torture, killing of civilians by war crimes or terror, destruction of 
evidence, helping criminals flee, abandoning duty, perjury, and interference 
in the performance of public duty with the intent of concealing facts.35  It 
also provides that the statute of limitations shall cease while a criminal is 
staying out of the country to evade prosecution, or during any period the 
case is being concealed or fabricated.36  However, the bill did not pass in the 
National Assembly. 
The second bill was the 2005 Special Act Bill for Statutory 
Limitations to the State Crimes against Human Rights.37  It excludes the 
application of the statute of limitations to killing or torture by state 
authorities in both criminal and civil cases.38  It provides that the statute of 
limitations shall cease for the crimes of destruction of evidence, illegal arrest 
and detainment, abuse of authority, hiding criminals, abandoning duty, and 
                                           
32
  See Bae Jong-dae, Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 95 (8th ed., 2005); 
Kim Il-su, Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW:GENERAL PART], 62 (11th ed., 2006); Lee Jae-sang, 
Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 19 (5th ed. 2003); Park Sang-Ki, Hyeongbeop 
Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 31 (6th ed. 2004); Shin Don-Woon, Hyeongbeop Chongron 
[CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 39-40 (2nd ed. 2006); Yim Woong, Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL 
LAW: GENERAL PART], 22 (2002). 
33
  See text accompanying notes 17-20. 
34 
 The Bill submitted as of May 24, 2002 (Bill No. 1582). 
35
  Id. art. 249(2). 
36
  Id. art. 253(3). 
37
  The Bill submitted as of July 11, 2005 (Bill No. 2222). 
38
  Id. arts. 2 & 4(1). 
588 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 3 
 
 
perjury during any period that the case is being concealed or fabricated.39  
These provisions are to apply to criminal cases where limitation periods do 
not expire.40  In civil cases, they are applicable to cases whose limitation 
periods have already expired.41  This bill utilizes a constitutionally safer way 
in that its extension of the limitation period is not applicable when the 
limitation period has already expired.  It took into account the possibility 
that the Constitutional Court could find the Act unconstitutional.  This bill 
also did not pass in the National Assembly. 
C. There Is a Contradiction Between the Application of Retroactive 
Justice and the Demand for Punishment 
There certainly exists the popular demand for punishment of officials 
who gravely infringed human rights under the old regime.  During the 
authoritarian-military rule, citizens had no opportunity to seek justice.  The 
prosecution of state crimes against human rights was impossible.  The ex 
post facto principle presupposes a possibility that citizens at least had a 
chance to pursue justice through law enforcement authorities.  Nevertheless 
citizens had to risk their safety to pursue punishment of state crimes against 
human rights under the authoritarian-military regime.  The principle must 
not be taken advantage of by state authority officials or agents who blocked 
investigation and prosecution against their own crimes.  To prevent 
prosecution because of the lapse of statute of limitations would hurt the 
popular sense of justice.  For that reason, retrospective application of an 
amended limitation period to time-barred prosecution should be allowed 
under very limited and special circumstances.  For instance, after the 
Liberation from Japanese Occupation (1910-1945), the Act for Punishing 
Anti-Nation Activities 42  was legislated in 1948 to punish pro-Japanese 
collaborators.  Additionally, after the April 1960 Revolution which ended the 
authoritarian Rhee Syung-Man government, the Act for Restricting the Civil 
Rights of Anti-Democracy Personals43 was enacted in 1960 to restrict for 
five to seven years civil rights of those who had participated in the Rhee 
                                           
39
  Id. art. 3. 
40
  Id. Appendix, art. 2(1). 
41
  Id. Appendix, art. 2(2). 
42
  Banminjok haengwi cheobeol beop [The Act for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities], Statutes of S. 
Korea, Law No. 3 of 1948 (abolished by Law No. 176 of 1951).  Different from France, however, the 
Special Committee for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities could not produce meaningful outcomes because 
of President Rhee Syung-Man’s interference and ultra right-wingers’ attack of the Special Committee. 
43
  Banminjoo haengwicha kongminkweon chehan beop [The Act for Restricting the Civil Rights of 
Anti-Democracy Personals], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 587 of 1960 (abolished by Law No. 1032 of 
1962). 
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government’s illegal activities, including the fabrication of the result of the 
March 15 general election of 1960. 
Different from extending a limitation period before a given 
prosecution is expired, however, much stricter constitutional review is 
demanded to apply an amended limitation period retrospectively after the 
limitation period has already expired.44  Procedural legality is required even 
to punish those who violated human rights under the authoritarian-military 
rule.  If the new democratic regime weakens procedural legality to serve 
substantive justice, it may satisfy the popular demand but undermine the 
new regime’s commitment to the rule of law.  This is the academic reason 
why the two bills to cease or exclude the application of the statute of 
limitations did not pass.  Ironically, procedural legality, which grew in 
Korean society after democratization, prevented the retrospective 
punishment of the perpetrators under the old regime after the limitation 
period had already expired.  The National Assembly was not sure if such an 
act could pass constitutional review by the Constitutional Court.  As a result, 
it was hesitant to fully advance retroactive justice in criminal cases.  
However, the National Assembly has been too hesitant in that, regardless of 
constitutional review, it could and should have passed a bill to retroactively 
extend criminal statutes of limitations so long as the limitation period has 
not already run. 
IV. RESTORING THE HONOR OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT 
ACTIVISTS  
A. The Next Step Is to Honor the Right of Resistance and Provide 
“Justice as Recognition” 
The next step to punish the perpetrators is to “restore the honor of 
those sacrificed for the democratization movement and their families, and 
provide compensation for them.” 45  Under the authoritarian-military regime, 
a great number of democratization movement activists were not only 
                                           
44
  For a leading American decision on the issue, see Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420 (1928).  
“Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life. 
The question turns upon how much violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play.  For 
the state to assure a man that he has become safe from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its assurance, 
seems to most of us unfair and dishonest.  But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to have it 
extended beyond the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forgives it.”  Id. at 425-426. 
45
  Minjoohwa undong kawnryeonja myeongye hoebok mit bosang e kwanhan beopryul [The Act for 
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them], 
Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6123 of 2000), art. 1 (last revised by Law No. 8273 of 2007). 
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expelled from their schools or companies, but also arrested, detained, and 
convicted for the violation of a number of laws such as the Anti-Communist 
Act,46 the National Security Act,47 and the Act Concerning Assembly and 
Demonstration.48  Punishment under these laws severely restricted political 
rights and freedoms. 
In January 2000, under the Kim Dae-Jung government, the Act for 
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing 
Compensation for Them was enacted (“Democracy Act”).  It owed much to 
the 422-day non-stop sit-in by human rights organizations such as the 
National Association of Bereaved Families for Democracy (cheonguk 
minjuhwa undong yukajok hyeopeuihwe) in front of the National Assembly. 
The Democracy Act defines “democratization movement” as 
“activities that contributed to establishing democratic constitutional order 
and resurrecting and enhancing freedoms and rights of people by resisting 
the authoritarian rule that had disturbed free democratic basic order and 
violated people’s fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution since 
August 7, 1969.”49 
The Democracy Act shows that the “right of resistance” against an 
illegitimate regime,50 which is not available in the Constitution, is officially 
recognized in the Democracy Act.  It implies that a number of “illegal” 
activities against “the” authoritarian rule may be justified as an exercise of 
“right of resistance.”  The act maintains the beginning date of the 
authoritarian rule as August 7, 1969, when the bill for revision of the 
Constitution was passed only by the ruling government party in order to let 
                                           
46
  Bangong beop [Anti-Communist Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 643 of 1961 (abolished by 
Law No. 3318 of 1980). 
47
  Kukgaboan beop [National Security Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 3318 of 1980 (last revised 
by Law No. 5454 of 1997).  For more discussion regarding this Act see Kuk Cho, Tension between the 
National Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea: Security for What?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125 
(1997). 
48 
 Chiphoe mit siwi e kwanhan beopryul [Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration], Statutes of 
S. Korea, Law No. 1245 of 1962 (last abolished by Law No. 7849 of 2001). 
49
  The Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing 
Compensation for Them, Act No. 6123, art. 2.1 (emphasis added). 
50
  The right to resist against illegitimate regime was incorporated into the documents of the 
American and French Revolutions.  See THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 107, 118 (Walter Laqueur & Barry 
Rubin ed., 1979).  The right was explicitly recognized in a number of early American state constitutions.  
For instance, Article Ten of the New Hampshire Constitution of 1797 states that “whenever the ends of 
government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are 
ineffectual, the doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and 
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”  [N.H. CONST. art. 10 (1797), reprinted in THE TREE OF 
LIBERTY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF REBELLION AND POLITICAL CRIME IN AMERICA 85 (Nicholas N. 
Kittrie & Eldon D., Jr. Wedlock eds., 1986). 
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President Park Chung-Hee be elected once more.51  Although the revision 
was approved by popular referendum later, it was the first step to make 
President Park a permanent president.52 
The Act also classifies “democratization movement involvers” into the 
following categories:  (i) those who were dead or lost in connection with the 
democratization movement, (ii) those who were injured in connection with 
the democratization movement, (iii) those who fell ill or became dead due to 
illness in connection with the democratization movement, and (iv) those 
who were convicted, fired or disciplined in connection with the 
democratization movement.53  The “democratization movement involvers” 
in the May 18 Uprising of 1980 are covered by the 1990 Act for Restoring 
the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing 
Compensation for Them.54 
The Review Committee for Restoring the Honor of Democratization 
Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them (“The Review 
Committee”)55  was organized under the prime minister with the task of 
examining whether or not applicants were “democratization movement 
involvers”, and deciding what kind of disposition was to be made for them.56  
Former Constitutional Court Justice Ha Kyong-Chul was appointed as 
chairman of the Review Committee.  Although the Review Committee itself 
is neither an investigative nor a judicial authority, it has authority to make a 
necessary inquiry into the case and make a request to the relevant 
authorities.57  It may recommend a pardon for those who were convicted in 
connection with the democratization movement, or abolishment of the 
record of their conviction.58  It may also make recommendations to state and 
local governments, or private companies to rehire those who were fired in 
                                           
51
  See Daehan minguk heonbeop [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA OF 1969],  art. 
69(3)(amended 1969; last amended 1987). 
52
  The Act does not provide an explanation why the beginning of the authoritarian rule was fixed on 
August 7, 1969 even though Presidents Rhee Syung-Man and Park Chung-Hee exercised authoritarian rule 
before the date.  It is assumed that the set up of the authoritarian rule in constitutional level on August 7, 
1969 was considered. 
53
   Minjoohwa undong kawnryeonja myeongye hoebok mit bosang e kwanhan beopryul [The Act for 
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them], 
Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6123 of 2000, art. 2.2 (last revised by Law No 8273 of 2007). 
54
  See Kwangju minjuhwa undong kwanryeonja bosang deung e kwanhan beopryul [Act for 
Compensation for the Victims in the Democratization Movement in Kwangju], Statutes of S. Korea Act, 
Law No. 4266 of 1990) (last revised by Law No. 7911 of 2006). 
55
  Minjoo.go.kr, http://www.minjoo.go.kr.  
56
  The Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing 
Compensation for Them, Act No.6123, art. 4(2). 
57
  Id. art. 2(1). 
58
  Id. art. 5-3. 
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connection with the democratization movement. 59   It may also make 
recommendations to schools to abolish records of discipline on those who 
were disciplined in connection with the democratization movement and to 
bestow honorary graduation diplomas to them.60 
Under the old regime, a number of democratization movement 
activists were given a label of “pro-communism” or “impure left leaning” 
radical subversives.61  Following the examination of the applications by the 
Review Committee, a number of democratization movement activists have 
been recognized as “democratization movement involvers.”  Disposition for 
honor restoration and compensation has been made for them.  As of 
December 28, 2006, 543 “democratization movement involvers” have been 
given a total of $28,700,000 in compensation. 62   The decisions of the 
Review Committee can be considered to give “justice as recognition” and 
“compensatory justice” to those who sacrificed themselves to fight for 
democracy.63 
One of the most high-profile cases is of the “People’s Revolution 
Party Rebuilding Committee” (inmin hyeokmyeong dang jaekeon 
wiwonhwei), (“PRP”).  This has been broadly known as a typical case of 
fabrication by torture.  As the anti-Yushin movement by college students and 
intellectuals was getting stronger in 1974, the KCIA arrested alleged PRP 
members because they had allegedly pursued a communist revolution with 
connections to North Korea.  Eight members were immediately executed just 
one day after their conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1975.  
For this reason, this case has been often called “judicial murder.”64 
In January 2006, the Review Committee decided that the conviction 
of sixteen PRP members was based on facts fabricated as a result of the 
KCIA’s severe torture, and the genuine reason why they were suppressed 
was because they had actively developed an anti-Yushin regime 
movement. 65   In December 2005, before the decision by the Review 
Committee, the Committee for Development through Finding Truth of the 
                                           
59
  Id. art. 5-4. 
60
  Id. art. 5-5. 
61
 James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral 
Process and Judicial Independence, in HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 139 (William Shaw ed., 1991). 
62
  Dong Jung-Min, [Recognizing 46 Illegal Labor Activists as Democtratic Activites], DONG-A ILBO, 
Dec. 18, 2006 (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
63
  Barahona, supra note 1, at 25. 
64
  Catholic Human Rights Committee, SABEOP SALIN: 1975 NYEON SAWOL EUI HAKSAL [JUDICIAL 
MURDER: THE MASSACRE OF APRIL 1975], 164-65 (2001). 
65
  The decision is available at  http://www.minjoo.go.kr/section/news/reportcontentDB.html?inum= 
113&iKind=3&szSearchWord=&szSearchItem=&IGotoPage=1 (last visited Apr. 26, 2007). 
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Past66 under the National Intelligence Service (the successor to the KCIA) 
also found that the PRP case was fabricated by torture.67  On December 27, 
2005, the Seoul Central District Court decided to reexamine the conviction 
of the members,68 and in January 23, 2007, the court overruled the previous 
conviction.69 
B. The Extent of the Democratization Movement Remains Controversial 
1. The Case of the Dong-Eui University Students—Embracing Counter-
Violence by the Democratization Movement 
In May 1989, students of Dong-Eui University staged a sit-in at the 
library building on campus to demonstrate against corrupt entrance exam 
procedures.  They also detained five police officers.  When the police 
entered the library to break up the sit-in, some students threw Molotov 
cocktails at the police.  A fire broke out, killing seven police officers.  The 
students were arrested and convicted of murder by arson.70  This violent 
confrontation between college students and the authoritarian regime’s police 
resulted in a terrible tragedy, which poses difficult questions of whether 
violent and lethal anti-regime activities can be considered a part of the 
democratization movement. 
It was inevitable that the Review Committee’s decision to 
acknowledge forty-six students of Dong-Eui University as “democratization 
movement involvers,” on April 27, 2002 would provoke controversy.  The 
Review Committee focused on the fact that the students’ conduct was a 
routine method of demonstration without intent to kill police officers at that 
time, even though it resulted in the death of several police officers; the grave 
                                           
66
  Baek Ki-Chul, [NIS Committee for Development through Finding Truth of the Past Starts], 
HANKYOREH (S. Korea), Nov. 2, 2004; Park Joo-Ho, [NIS Begins Truth Finding of the Past] KOOKMIN ILBO 
(S. Korea), Nov. 2, 2004; Chang Yong-Hoon, [NIS Starts out to Find Truth of the Past], YONHAP NEWS (S. 
Korea), Nov. 2, 2004. 
67
  Lee Hee-Jin,[The PRP Case Fabricated as Directed by Park Chung-Hee], HANKOOK ILBO (S. 
Korea), Dec. 12, 2005;  Son Byung-Ho,[The Truth Finding Committee Said the PRP Case was Fabricated 
on the Request of the Former President Park] KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), Dec. 7, 2005; Chung Joon-
Young.,[Behind the PRP Case, There was a Man in Power], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), Dec. 7, 2005. 
68
  Chun Ji-Sung & Chung Hyo-Shin, [The People’s Revolution Party Case Will Be on Retrial After 
30 Years], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Dec. 28, 2005; Choe Young-Yoon, [The People’s Revolution Party 
Case Is Decided to Be on Retrial], HANKOOK ILBO (S. Korea), Dec. 27, 2005; Ko Na-Moo, [The Truth of 
Judicial Murder Will Be Revealed After 30 Years], HANKYOREH (S. Korea), Dec. 27, 2005. 
69
  Lee Jong-Suk, [Sentence of Innocence to the Defendants of the People’s Revolution Party Case 
After 32 Years], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Jan. 24, 2007; Choe Young-Yoon, [Sentence of Innocence to the 
People’s Revolution Party Case After 32 Years], HANKOOK ILBO (S. Korea), Jan. 24, 2007; Park Sung-Woo, 
[No Evidence to Prove Anti-State Organization], JOONG ANG ILBO (S. Korea), Jan. 24, 2007. 
70
  Decision of June 22, 1990, 90 Do 767 & 90 Do 764 (Korean Supreme Court). 
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result of the students’ conduct did not prevent their conduct from being 
regarded as part of a democratization movement. 
The family members of the dead police officers filed a constitutional 
petition to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the decision of the Review 
Committee and the Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization 
Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them violated their 
constitutional rights.  On October 27, 2005, a 5-to-4 majority opinion of the 
Constitutional Court rejected the petition because (i) the family members did 
not have standing for the petition; (ii) the decision did not necessarily cast 
the dead police officers in a negative light because the officers already 
received the title of “officers of merit”; and (iii) the Act is constitutional 
because it does not disadvantage those who stood on the opposite side of the 
democratization movement.71  However, the minority opinion argued that the 
decision of the Review Committee was unconstitutional because, despite the 
students’ desire to resist the authoritarian regime, the students resorted to 
means which were destructive, which cannot be tolerated in a democratic 
order.  The minority opinion reasoned that if the students’ conduct was 
acknowledged as a democratization movement, the dead policemen would 
inevitably be considered agents of the authoritarian regime.72 
In addition to other police officers, conservative party members and 
newspapers strongly objected to the Review Committee and the 
Constitutional Court’s two decisions, claiming that these decisions turned 
cop-killers into democratization movement activists.73  Criticism was raised 
from a different standpoint as well.  Moon Boo-Sik, who as a student 
movement leader in 1982 burnt the American Culture Center in Pusan, 
causing an innocent student’s death to protest the U.S. government’s 
leniency toward Korea’s authoritarian regime, called for serious reflection 
on the use of counter-violence by a democratization movement.74 
The Review Committee and the majority opinion of the Constitutional 
Court seemed to consider the socio-political background of the tragedy, in 
which tear gas bombs from the police and Molotov cocktails from 
demonstrating students were exchanged.  They also seemed to consider the 
contribution of student movements toward democratization.  Article 2 of the 
                                           
71
  Decision of October 27, 2005, 2002 HunMa 425 (Korean Constitutional Court). 
72
  Id. (Kwon, J., Kim, J., Song, J., Joo, J., dissenting). 
73
  Editorial, [Rethinking Democratic Movement], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Oct. 28, 2005; Editorial, 
[The Dong-Eui University Case: The Violence Unallowable Under the Liberal Democracy], MUNHAW ILBO 
(S. Korea), Apr. 28, 2006; Editorial, [Did The Consitutional Court Reflect the Historical Consciousness on 
its Dismissal of the Dong-Eui University Case?], SEGYE ILBO (S. Korea), Oct. 28, 2005. 
74
  Moon Boo-Sik, IN SEARCH OF THE LOST MEMORY—THINKING OF THE AGE OF MADNESS 
(ileobeorin kieok eul chataseo—kwangkieui sidae reul saenggak ham), chap. 5 (2002). 
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Act seems to consider the deaths of state authority officers as an acceptable 
collateral consequence of recognizing the “right of resistance” in the 2000 
Democracy Act.75  The fact that the Dong-Eui University students were 
given the title of “democratization movement involvers” while the sacrificed 
police officers were given the title of “officers of merit” shows the 
complicated situation of the past.  Despite the fact that the Dong-Eui 
University students were legally classified as “democratization movement 
involvers,” there still remains a more fundamental question about the 
legitimacy of counter-violence against the old regime.  To cite Moon Boo-
Sik: 
It is not honest to say that several kinds of counter-violence was 
all inevitable, or had a nature of self-defense.  Criticism on the 
context of democratization movement that did not limit the use 
of violence as an inevitable means of resistance, defense and 
last resort for expression, . . . rather advocated violence as a 
tool to create a new power has been reserved because it may 
work as a ground to justify the violence of state authority.76 
2. The Case of the “National Liberation Front of South Korea” 
Embraced the Leftist Democratization Movement 
It is also noteworthy that in March 2006 the Review Committee 
acknowledged twenty-nine members of the “National Liberation Front of 
South Korea” (Namchoseon minjokhaebang cheonseon, hereinafter “NLF”) 
as “democratization movement involvers.”77 
During the late 1970s, the NLF vigorously fought against the 
authoritarian-military regime with an anti-America, anti-Yushin, and anti-
capitalism agenda, and its members were punished heavily for violating the 
Anti-Communist Act and the National Security Act.  Its leader was 
sentenced to capital punishment, but died after being tortured before his 
scheduled execution; another leader also was executed. 
While the Review Committee fully recognized the radical, left-wing 
characteristics of the NLF, it acknowledged that the NLF’s activities in 
                                           
75
  Minjoohwa undong kawnryeonja myeongye hoebok mit bosang e kwanhan beopryul [The Act for 
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them], 
Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6123 of 2000, art. 2.1 (last revised by Law No 8273 of 2007). 
76
  Moon, supra note 74, at 165 (translated by this author). 
77
  See REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR RESTORING THE HONOR OF DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT 
INVOLVERS AND PROVIDING COMPENSATION FOR THEM, REPORT: NAMINJUHN GWANRYON BODO E DEHAN 
HAEMYUNG (2006), available at http://www.minjoo.go.kr/section/news/reportcontentDB.html?inum= 
115&iKind=3&szSearchWord=&szSearchItem=&IGotoPage=1. 
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general could be considered as political resistance against the authoritarian 
Yushin regime.  Conservative right-wing newspapers and civic organizations 
strongly criticized the decision of the Review Committee because the 
ultimate goal of the NLF was a leftist revolution.78 
The decision shows that the Review Committee understands and 
embraces the leftist democratization movement in a broad sense.  The Anti-
Communist Act and the National Security Act reflected the anti-communist 
ideology of the authoritarian-military regime, and considered all leftist 
activities “non-democratic” and severely punished them.  The Review 
Committee in this decision aimed to evaluate impartially the contribution of 
the leftist democratization movement.  Its decision fell in line with the 
decision of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs in February 2002 
and in August 2005 to confer decorations on a number of leftist activists 
who fought for national liberation under the Japanese Occupation.79  Similar 
to the liberation movement against the Japanese Occupation, the leftist 
democratization movement was acknowledged as an integral part of the 
broader democratization movement against the authoritarian-military 
regime. 
The Review Committee’s decision reveals that Korea has freed itself 
of the “red complex” which at one time overshadowed it.  It also reflects the 
broader political spectrum of contemporary Korean democracy.  A leftist 
party such as the “Democratic Labor Party” (minju nodong dang), which 
could have been harshly punished had it been organized under the 
authoritarian-military regime, is currently legalized and has seats in the 
National Assembly. 
                                           
78
  Editorial, [A “Champion of Democracy” Who Stole Military Weapons Attempting to Communize 
South Korea],  DONG-A ILBO (S. KOREA), Mar. 16, 2006; Editorial, [Ungrounded Decisions Regarding 
Democratization Movements], SEGYE ILBO (S. KOREA), Mar. 16, 2006. 
79
  Kim Jung-Kwon, [54 Socialists Recognized by Decoration], HANKOOK ILBO (S. KOREA), Feb. 22, 
2005;  Jun Sung-Chul, [Independence Movement 214 Persons Aug. 15 Decoration], HANKOOK ILBO (S. 
KOREA), Aug. 3, 2005; Sung Gul Kim, [Decorations Granted to 214 Independence Fighters Including 
Socialists], HANKYOREH (S. KOREA), Aug. 3, 2005; Media News Team, [54 Socialists Recognized as 
Fighters for Independence], KYONH-HYANG SHINUM (S. KOREA), Feb. 22, 2002; Choi Hyun-Soo, [The 
Decorations Awarded to Leftists: No More Ideological Basis.], KOOKMIN ILBO (S. KOREA), Feb. 22, 2002; 
Yang Sung-Wook, [Independence Day Decoration for Fighters for Independence], MUNHWA ILBO (S. 
KOREA), Feb. 22, 2002. 
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V. THE TRUTH COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION AND SANCTIONS 
CONCERNING SUSPICIOUS DEATHS 
A. Choosing Truth-Finding Rather than Oblivion 
Under the authoritarian-military regime a number of democratization 
activists and critical intellectuals were found dead.  State authorities 
announced that they had died either by accident or suicide.  The torture 
victims’ outcries were not heard under that regime and the State ignored the 
families’ requests to re-examine the cause of these suspicious deaths.  
Suggestions that law enforcement officers tortured citizens during 
interrogation, or that they concealed such deaths resulting from torture, often 
were treated as fallacious attacks on the regime’s legitimacy.  It was only 
after democratization that victims and their families were given credence. 
The Special Act for Truth-Finding about Suspicious Deaths was 
passed in 2001 under the Kim Dae-Jung government.  Like the 2000 Act for 
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing 
Compensation for Them, the Special Act owed much to the non-stop sit-in in 
front of the National Assembly by the Korea Association of Bereaved 
Families for Democracy.80  The Korean public wanted to disrupt the silence 
of the past to learn the truth.  The Presidential Truth Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths (“The Truth Commission”) was established for this task,81 
and it investigated the circumstances surrounding the suspicious deaths 
related the democratization movement before June 2004.  Professors Yang 
Seung-Kyu and Han Sang-Beom served consecutive terms as chairman of 
the Commission. 
The Special Act defined “suspicious death” as “deaths that occurred 
with relation to the democratization movement whose cause has not been 
identified and which shows probable cause that it might have resulted from 
direct or indirect illegal exercise of state authority.”82  The definition of 
“democratization movement” followed the definition provided by the 2000 
Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and 
Providing Compensation for Them.83 
                                           
80
  Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of 
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001, art. 1 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of 
2005). 
81
  Id. art. 3. 
82
  Id. art. 2. 
83
  Id.; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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The Truth Commission was given the authority to initiate an 
investigation of a suspicious death upon the filing of a petition, or by its own 
decision in the absence of a petition.84  Its powers were as follows:  it could 
request relevant individuals to appear for investigation and relevant 
authorities to submit data and materials pertinent to the investigation;85 it 
also could perform a field investigation in the place where the suspicious 
death allegedly occurred;86 if it found evidence of a crime, it could file a 
complaint to the Attorney General or the Chief of the Military General 
Staff,87 and request law enforcement authorities to investigate the case;88 it 
could issue an “order of accompanying” to a person who refused to appear 
without just cause;89 if its investigation concluded that the suspicious death 
resulted from an illegal exercise of state authority in the process of 
democratization, the Truth Commission was obliged to request the Review 
Committee for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement 
Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them to review the case.90 
However, the Truth Commission was neither an investigative nor a 
judicial authority, and therefore it was given neither the authority to search 
and seize relevant materials and institute prosecution, nor the authority to 
subpoena witnesses and suspects.  Law enforcement authorities did not want 
to provide the Truth Commission with such authority.  Only administrative 
fines could be imposed on those who did not cooperate with the Truth 
Commission’s investigation without just cause or refused to follow the 
request for appearance without just cause.91  In this sense, the activities of 
the Truth Commission were so limited that it had difficulty discovering the 
truth surrounding suspicious deaths without the voluntary cooperation of 
relevant persons and state authorities. 
                                           
84
  The Special Act for Truth-Finding of Suspicious Deaths, Law No. 6170, art. 21. 
85
  Id. art. 22(1). 
86
  Id. art. 22(3). 
87
  Id. art. 25(1). 
88
  Id. art. 25(2). 
89
  Id. art. 22 (8). 
90
  Id. art. 26. 
91
  Id. art. 37. Imprisonment may be imposed on those who committed assault or battery to the 
officials of the Truth Commission.  Id. art. 34. 
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B. Three Major Decisions by the Truth Commission Found Suspicious 
Deaths Related to the Democratization Movement 
The Truth Commission recognized thirty cases in total as cases of 
“suspicious death,” 92 while it classified others as “impossible to 
investigate”93 due to a lack of evidence and dismissed those that lacked 
merit.  Major decisions are reviewed below. 
1. The Case of Victims Killed Under “Protective Custody” 
In 2001 the Truth Commission acknowledged that the deaths of two 
inmates, which occurred while they were incarcerated under the pretext of 
“protective custody” (bohokamho),94 were “suspicious deaths.” 
In 1980 the military coup committee issued Martial Order No. 13, 
which was to put vagrants and repeat criminals into concentration camps 
under the name of “Samcheong Education.” 95   Later the “Legislative 
Council for Protection of the State” wrote the Social Protection Act96 to 
provide legal grounds for applying the Martial Order retroactively.  The 
Social Protection Act imposed “protective custody” on repeat felons when 
they were found to have “danger of recommitting crimes.”97   However, 
under the Act even ordinary citizens who were neither vagrant nor criminal 
were incarcerated in the camps.  Inmates were extremely abused under the 
harsh and oppressive “education.”  Later, those who were put under 
“protective custody” were incarcerated in strict confinement centers in the 
Cheongsong region. 
                                           
92
  Kim Nam-Kwon, [The Second Suspcious Death Activites Outlook] , YONHAP NEWS (S. KOREA), 
Apr. 30, 2003; Choi Sung-Hyun, [The Second Suspicious Death Activites Report to Cheongwadae], 
YONHAP NEWS (S. KOREA), July 30, 2004. 
93
  The Special Act for Truth-Finding of Suspicious Deaths, Law No. 6170, art. 24-2.  The decision of 
“impossibility of investigation” is made when the Truth Commission finds that it was not clear if the death 
happened in the process of democratization movement, or resulted from illegal exercise of state authority. 
94
  “Protective custody” is one of “protective security measures” (boancheobun or Maβnahmen in 
German).  In Korean criminal law, there are two types of criminal sanctions:  punishment and “protective 
security measures.”  The Korean Constitution provides legal basis for this distinction, saying that no 
punishment or protective security disposition shall be imposed without law [The Constitution, §12 (1)].  
These two sanctions are distinguished in theory in that the first is imposed on those with the capability to be 
responsible for their past criminal conduct, while the second is used to rehabilitate criminals and protect 
society from any future crimes that non-rehabilitated criminals may commit.  The second is prescribed 
mainly in special criminal acts. 
95
  See generally Suh Young-Soo, SAMCHEONG KYOYOOKDAE: POGORYONG 13 HO [SAMCHEONG 
EDUCATION UNIT: THE MARTIAL ORDER NO. 13] (2004). 
96
  Sahoeboho Beop [Social Protection Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 3286 of 1980, (abolished 
by Law No. 7656 of 2005). 
97
  Id. art. 5. 
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The Truth Commission found that in 1981, Jean Jeong-Bae had been 
shot dead in a concentration camp by military officers while protesting 
against the “Samcheong Education.”  It was determined that he was involved 
in the democratization movement because he contested his illegal 
detainment by requesting a formal trial and met with a higher-ranking 
official.98  In 1984, jailors cruelly treated Park Young-Doo, and he died in a 
discipline cell at a heavy confinement facility in the Cheongsong region after 
he demanded the abolition of “protective custody,” an end to jailors’ 
violence against inmates, and improvement of treatment for inmates.  His 
body was buried without an autopsy or his family’s attendance.99 
2. The Case of Professor Tsche Chong-Kil, Killed During Interrogation 
by the KCIA 
In May 2002, the Truth Commission acknowledged that the death of 
Professor Tsche Chong-Kil of Seoul National University College of Law 
was a “suspicious death.”100 
In 1973, Professor Tsche was found dead in a KCIA building and the 
KCIA announced that he had committed suicide by throwing himself out of 
a building after confessing he was a spy for North Korea.  The KCIA 
interrogated him because a self-surrendered North Korean spy had 
mentioned his name.  However, the Truth Commission found that KCIA 
agents tortured him during interrogation and that he had never confessed to 
being a spy.  They further determined there was a high probability that he 
was killed and his body was thrown away by the agents; and even if he did 
throw himself, it was probably to evade additional torture by the agents.  
They also found the case of a spy group in Europe that the KCIA announced 
after his death was fabricated. 
                                           
98
  Kim Hoon, [Suspicious Death: Truth-Finding Commission Recognizing the Death at Samcheoung 
Education Camp as a Democrazation Movement.], THE HANKYOREH (S. Korea), Sept. 16, 2001; Oh Nam-
Suk, [Jean Jeong-Bae Shot Dead in a Concentration Camp is Recognized to be Involved in a 
“Democratization Movement.”], MUNHWA ILBO (S. Korea), Sept. 17, 2001. 
99
  Yang Ki-Dae, [First Recognition of Mysterious Death at Samcheong Education: Mr. Park Young-
Doo’s Death Due to Prison Official Violence], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), June 25, 2001; Jung Young-Oh, 
[Recognition of Park [Young Doo’s Death as Associated with Democratic Movement], HANKUK ILBO (S. 
Korea), June 25, 2001; Kang Young-Soo, [Mysterious Death of Park Young-Doo: Caused by Prison Official 
Abuse], KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), June 25, 2001; Kim Sung-Jin, [Mysterious Death: First Recognition of 
Democratic Association], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), June 25, 2001. 
100
  Min Dong-Yong, [Fabricated Espionage Allegation by the Government Proved: Professor Tsche 
Recognized as a Victim of Suspicious Death.], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), May 27, 2002; Kim Jae-Joong, 
[Truth-Finding Commission Concluded Professor Tsche was Killed by the Government Exercising Public 
Powers], KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), May 27, 2002; Kim Nam-Kwon, [Recognition of Professor Tsche 
Chong-Kil’s Death as Related to Democratization Movement], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), May 27, 2002. 
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In February 2006, the Seoul High Court decided that the State should 
provide about 1.8 billion won (equivalent to approximately 1.9 million U.S. 
dollars) to Professor Tsche’s family as compensation.  The court reasoned 
that the state cannot rely on the statute of limitations if state authorities have 
fabricated and concealed the truth. 101   As in Susie Kim’s case, 102  this 
decision reflects that Korean jurisprudence distinguishes retroactive civil 
sanction from retroactive criminal sanction. 
3. A Controversial Case: North Korean Spies Killed in Prison 
In July 2004, the Truth Commission made a controversial decision.  It 
acknowledged that the death in prison of two former North Korean spies and 
one former communist partisan during the Korean War were “suspicious 
deaths.”103  It found that state authorities tortured and forced them to convert 
their political beliefs before they were killed in prison under the Yushin 
regime.  The Social Security Act 104  enacted in 1975 enabled the 
imprisonment of a number of non-converted leftists, including North Korean 
spies, after they had served their sentences on the grounds that there was a 
“danger of recommitting crimes.”105  “Security custody,” which is another 
kind of “protective security measures,”106 was imposed by the Ministry of 
Justice,107 not the judiciary, and could be renewed repeatedly until “anti-
communism was established” in the leftists’ minds.108  Under this system, 
leftists who refused to submit a “conversion document” to state authorities 
faced the danger that they might never be released. 
The Truth Commission confirmed that the three inmates were killed 
by “illegal exercise of state authority,” although it was disputed whether 
their death met the requirement of the “death happening with relation to the 
democratization movement” in the Special Act.109  The Truth Commission 
                                           
101
  [Seoul High Court decided, “the State should provide about 1.8 billion won to Professor Tsche’s 
family as compensation”], THE LAW TIMES (S. Korea), Feb. 25, 2006. 
102
  See text accompanying notes 30-32. 
103
  Kim Sung-Hoon, [A New Controversy: Truth Commision Recognized Leftsts’ Contribution to 
Demoritization], MUNHAW ILBO (S. Korea), July 1, 2004; Jung Sung-Ho, [Controversy over the Truth 
Commission Recognizing Non-Converted Leftists to be Involved in Demoratization], YONHAP NEWS (S. 
Korea), July 2, 2004. 
104
  Sahoeancheon Beop [Social Security Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 2769 of 1975 (last 
revised by Law No. 3993 of 1987). 
105
  Id. § 6 (1). 
106
  See supra note 94. 
107
  Social Security Act, supra note 104, § 7 (4). 
108
  Id. § 7 (1). 
109
  Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of 
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001, art. 2 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of 
2005) (emphasis added). 
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interpreted the requirement broadly, maintaining that it was unconstitutional 
and illegal to force them to convert their political beliefs, and that their 
resistance contributed to the abolishment of the undemocratic “conversion 
system.”  Conservative politicians, newspapers, and civic organizations 
strongly criticized the decision, arguing that the inmates adhered to their 
communist beliefs and their resistance could not be classified as a part of the 
democratization movement.110 
Soon after the Truth Commission rendered its decision, the Review 
Committee for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement 
Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them111 rejected the decision of 
the Truth Commission.112  The Review Committee has the final authority to 
confirm whether a suspicious death is related to the democratization 
movement.113  The Review Committee distinguished North Korean spies 
from home-grown leftists, as it acknowledged in 2006 that the activities of 
the home-grown leftist NLF belonged to the democratization movement.114  
Separate civil suits may be pursued to compensate for the deaths of the two 
former North Korean spies and the one former communist partisan. 
C. Conclusion: The Truth Commission Made Great Achievements 
Despite Limitations 
The Truth Commission was dissolved in 2004.  It left a number of 
unsolved cases.  For instance, mysteries still surround the deaths of Chang 
Joon-Ha, a leading dissident against the Park Chung-Hee regime, found dead 
on a mountain in 1974, and two student activists, Lee Chul-Kyu and Lee 
Rae-Chang, who were found dead in a reservoir and on a beach respectively 
in 1999.  Crucial witnesses and evidence were not available after the long 
lapse of time since their deaths.  It is necessary to note, from the beginning 
                                           
110
  Editorial,  [Even Spys are Democratization Fighters to the Eyes of the Truth Comission], DONG-A 
ILBO (S. Korea), July 2, 2004; Editorial, [A Country Recognizing Even North Korean Spys as 
Democratization Fighters], MUNHWA ILBO (S. Korea), July 2, 2004; Editorial, [They Said North Korean 
Spys Contributed to Democratization], PUSAN ILBO (S. Korea), July 2, 2004; Editorial, [A Refusal to Turn 
From a Spy is a Demoratization Movement?], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 2, 2004. 
111
  See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
112
  Choi Young-Yun, [Millitary Tribunal Should be Disbanded Except During War Time], HANKOOK 
ILBO (S. Korea), July 30, 2004; Kang Ju-Hwa, [Truth Commission’s Report Calls for Invalidating the 
Convictions Against Democratization Activists and Establishing an Authority to Find the Cause Of Deaths], 
KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), July 30, 2004; Cho Sung-Hyun [The Truth Commission Presses the 
Governmement to Establish an Authority to Identify the Cause of Death.], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 
30, 2004. 
113
  Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of 
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001, art. 26 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of 
2005). 
114
  See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
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the Truth Commission had limited legal authority to discover the actual truth 
about suspicious deaths; 115  and other state authorities were reluctant to 
cooperate with the investigation of the Truth Commission for fear that their 
own misconduct would be uncovered. 116   When concluding their 
investigation, the Truth Commission recommended that the government and 
the National Assembly enact a new law to bar application of the statute of 
limitations to state crimes against human rights, to punish perjury or refusal 
to submit relevant materials in hearings for rectifying past wrongs, and to 
require disclosure of all information regarding past wrongs.117 
Despite these difficulties, however, the Truth Commission made 
substantial contributions to advancement of Korean society.  Their findings 
consoled the victims’ hurt souls and healed the trauma of the victims’ 
families.  They also made Korean people look back on the dark shadow of 
the painful past and made them determined to maintain democracy in 
Korean society. 
VI. BROADENING THE SCOPE OF ILLUSTRATING PAST WRONGS 
A. Uncovering the Activities of Pro-Japanese Collaborators Under the 
Japanese Occupation and Reverting Their Property to the State 
The fact that the pro-Japanese Koreans who sided with Japanese rule 
and oppressed the Korean liberation movement under the Japanese 
Occupation (1910-1945) were not thoroughly investigated and justly 
sanctioned even after the Liberation of 1945 has posed a lingering political 
and social problem for Koreans. 
President Rhee Syung-Man and his far right-wing conservative allies, 
who gained political hegemony over the left after the Liberation, objected to 
the thorough abolition of colonial legacies.  With a strong anti-communist 
and anti-North Korean agenda, pro-Japanese Koreans supported the party’s 
fight against the leftist movement in South Korea.  Although in 1948 the Act 
for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities 118  was enacted and the Special 
Committee for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities was formed in the National 
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  See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
116
  Park Jung-Hyun & Koo Hye-Young, [Truth Commision Reports Non-cooperation of State 
Authorities], SEOUL SHINMUN (S. Korea), Aug. 18, 2004; Koo Young-Sil, [Gate of the Military Ingormation 
Agency Has Yet to Be Open], OHMYNEWS (S. Korea), June 11, 2004. 
117
  Sung Ho Chung, [The Second Report on Suspicious Death Activities], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), 
Dec. 8, 2004. 
118
  Banminjok haengwi cheobeol beop [The Act for Punishing Ant-Nation Activities], Law No. 3 of 
1948 (abolished by Law No. 176 of 1951). 
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Assembly, President Rhee and his political allies substantially interfered 
with the activities of the Special Committee.  The Special Committee was 
ultimately dissolved without any meaningful achievement.119  Since then, 
pro-Japanese Koreans have survived and even flourished in Korea.  
Successive authoritarian-military governments have not attempted to 
investigate them.  The fact that a number of political and social leaders 
including Park Chung-Hee had served as a bureaucrat or military officer 
under the Japanese Occupation was one of the factors that prevented 
thorough investigation of the pro-Japanese Koreans’ activities under the 
Japanese Occupation.120 
Although the legacy of the Japanese Occupation in Korean society has 
received much academic attention, it was not until the Roh Moo-Hyun 
government that legal action was taken to address these issues.  There has 
been strong pressure from civil society to investigate the pro-Japanese 
Koreans’ activities under the Japanese Occupation.  For instance, in August 
1999, 10,000 professors signed a declaration demanding that an 
Encyclopedia of Anti-Nation Pro-Japanese Collaborators be published.121  
Then, in 2001 the Institute for Research of the Nation Issues, 122  an 
independent research organization, formed a board of editors to take 
responsibility for publishing it.  The public further demonstrated its interest 
in and support for this project by successfully completing a fundraising 
campaign and raising the funds required for the project in 2004 after the 
government had cut off public funding for the project in 2003.123 
Although the Korean Constitution provides “No citizen shall suffer 
unfavorable treatment on account of an act not of his own doing but 
committed by a relative,” 124  a label of descendants of pro-Japanese 
collaborators is likely to entail significant social and political damage to 
politicians.  Conservatives at first were concerned that legal action could 
lead to political biases that would harm conservative political leaders, 
                                           
119
  See Yi Kang-Soo, Banminteulwi Yeonku [A Study of the Special Committee for Punishing Anti-
Nation Activities], 155-218, 315-320 (2003); Huh Jong, Banminteukwi eui Chojik kwa Hwaldong [The 
Organization and Activties of the Special Committee for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities], 330-356 (2003). 
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RECTIFIED] (1994). 
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  Kim Nam Kwon, [Petition for the Encyclopedia of Pro-Japanese Collaborators Are Being 
Propelled], YONHAP NEWS, Nov. 29, 2001. 
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(S. Korea), Aug. 9, 2005; Shim Hui-Jung, [List of Pro-Japanese Collaborators], KYUNG HYANG SHINMUN 
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  See Daehan minguk heonbeop [The CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], art. 13(3). 
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including Park Geun-Hye, a daughter of Park Chung-Hee, but public support 
for the Special Act overwhelmed their opposition.125  The newly-revealed 
fact that the parents or great-grandparents of some leading liberal politicians, 
including Shin Ki-Nam, 126 shockingly were found to have served under the 
Japanese rule also neutralized the conservatives’ concern.  As a result, 
objections to legal action became politically incorrect and politically risky.  
In 2004, the Special Act for Finding the Truth of Anti-Nation Activities 
under the Japanese Occupation was enacted.127 
In 2005, the Presidential Committee for Act for Finding the Truth of 
Pro-Japanese Anti-Nation Activities (“Presidential Committee”) was 
organized and Professor Kang Man-Kil, a leading historian, was appointed 
as chairman. 128  The Presidential Committee is to investigate “pro-Japanese 
anti-Nation activities”; to collect, analyze, and edit data about “pro-Japanese 
anti-Nation activities”; and to establish a historical museum about “pro-
Japanese anti-Nation activities.”129 
The Special Act classifies “pro-Japanese anti-Nation activities” into 
twenty categories.  These include: attacking or obstructing the liberation 
movement; killing, abusing, or arresting liberation movement activists or 
their family members; leading an organization with the purpose of 
obstructing the liberation movement; spying for the Japanese regime; 
making or conspiring to make a treaty with the Japanese government to 
infringe the Korean Nation’s sovereignty; receiving a peerage from Japanese 
government for their activities for Korea’s annexation to Japan; forcing 
females to provide sexual services for the Japanese army; cooperating and 
participating as a military officer in the Japanese invasion; performing 
activities as a high-ranking government official to suppress Koreans; and 
cooperating with the Japanese destruction of Korean culture and carrying 
Korean cultural heritages out of Korea.130 
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  Media Khan News Team, [Park Geun-Hye Is Against the Pro-Japanaese Collaborators Act], 
KYUNG HYANG SHINMUN (S. Korea), July 13, 2004; Kim Hyun-Jaw & Kim Chung-Sun, [Political Dispute 
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The Presidential Committee was given a four-year mandate to initiate 
investigations of anti-Nation activities at its own volition.131  The Committee 
may request relevant individuals to appear for inquiry, and require relevant 
individuals and authorities to submit pertinent data and materials.132  It may 
issue an order of accompaniment to a person who has crucial evidentiary 
proof or information but refuses to appear more than three times without just 
cause.133  Like the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths,134 
the Presidential Committee is neither an investigative nor a judicial 
authority.  Most often administrative fines could be imposed only on those 
who obstructed the inquiry of the Presidential Committee, 135  although 
imprisonment may be imposed on those who made a false statement or 
submitted false materials with the purpose of obstructing the investigation.136  
The Presidential Committee currently is engaged in preliminary matters. 
In the same context that the 2004 Special Act for Finding the Truth of 
Anti-Nation Activities under the Japanese Occupation was passed, the 2005 
Special Act for Reverting the Property of Anti-Nation Pro-Japanese 
Collaborators to State was enacted in 2005.137 
The 2005 Special Act was passed in response to public outcry over 
court rulings, which enabled descendants of pro-Japanese Koreans to 
retrieve lands and properties from the State.  These descendants, who filed 
lawsuits, won in some instances even though the lands were given by the 
Japanese government in exchange for their ascendants’ pro-Japanese 
activities.138  For example, the great-grandson of Lee Wan-Yong, who as 
Prime Minister of the short-lived Empire of Korea (1897-1910) facilitated 
Korea’s annexation to Japan and received a peerage from the Japanese 
government for his pro-Japanese efforts, won back his great-grandfather’s 
lands in a civil trial in the Seoul High Court in 1997.139  The public furvor 
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over this result led the National Assembly to pass the 2005 Special Act.  The 
Act aims to prevent the successors or descendants of the pro-Japanese 
Koreans who received properties from the Japanese government given in 
exchange for “pro-Japanese anti-Nation activities” from retrieving such 
properties.140 
B. Making a Politically Neutral Extension of Past Lustration:  The 2005 
Basic Act for Coping with Past History for Truth and Reconciliation 
The two laws—the “2000 Act for Restoring the Honor of 
Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for 
Them” and the “2001 Special Act for Truth-Finding of Suspicious Deaths” 
—have received criticism from two different angles.  From one side, liberals 
complain that the laws do not cover past wrongs committed by the state 
before August 7, 1969,141 and that the Truth Commission on Suspicious 
Deaths was dissolved without resolving a number of high profile cases.142  
On the other side, conservatives argue that the laws do not cover the terrors 
and human rights violations committed by those who were antagonistic to 
the Republic of Korea.  In 2004, each political party submitted its own bills 
to rectify past wrongs.143 
In 2005 the Basic Act for Coping with Past History for Truth and 
Reconciliation was enacted in 2005 as a compromise.144  The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was established as an independent organization, 
and Catholic Father Song Kee-In, who has been a long-time advisor to 
President Roh Moo-Hyun, was appointed as chairman.145 
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The Basic Act calls for inquiry into the following:  (i) the anti-
Japanese liberation movement before or under the Japanese Occupation, (ii) 
the history of overseas Koreans who have maintained the sovereignty of 
Korea or enhanced national capability since the Japanese Occupation, (iii) 
the unlawful killings of civilians from August 15, 1945, to the Korean War, 
(iv) death, injury, and disappearance as a result of unlawful or conspicuously 
improper exercises of state authority, such as conduct destructive to 
constitutional order, serious human rights violations and cases of fabricated 
facts from August 15, 1945, through the period of authoritarian rule, (v) 
terror, human rights violations, violence, massacre, and suspicious deaths 
committed by those who denied the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea or 
were hostile to the Republic of Korea from August 15, 1945, to the period of 
authoritarian rule, and (vi) cases for which the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has recognized the necessity of investigation.146 
Subsections (iii) and (iv) provided for in the extension of the 2000 Act 
for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and 
Providing Compensation for Them and the 2001 Special Act for Truth-
Finding of Suspicious Deaths.  They resulted from liberals’ requests to 
broaden the investigative scope of human rights violations by the State.  
Subsection (v) stems from conservatives’ requests to include the 
investigation of human rights violations committed by North Korean 
authorities or pro-North Korean leftist civilian organizations.  Thus, 
uncovering the truth remains significantly influenced by politics in the 
present. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was given a four-year 
mandate to initiate investigations on suspicious deaths when a petition is 
filed or by its own volition absent a petition.147  It may request relevant 
individuals to submit an affidavit and appear for inquiry, and relevant 
individuals and authorities to submit pertinent data and materials.148  It may 
also conduct a field investigation in the place where the cause of a case has 
occurred.149   It may issue an order of accompaniment to a person who 
refuses to appear more than three times without just cause.150 
Like the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths,151 the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is neither an investigative nor a 
                                           
146
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147
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judicial authority.  Primarily, administrative fines can be imposed only on 
those who make false statements or submit false information, refuse or 
evade the Commission’s field investigation, or refuse to follow an order of 
accompaniment.152  However, imprisonment may be imposed on those who 
submit a false application with the purpose of harming another’s honor or 
with the intent to obstruct the activities of the Commission.153  The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission may recommend non-prosecution, lesser 
punishment, or pardon for offenders who actively cooperate with its truth-
finding efforts, and the relevant state authority shall respect the 
recommendation.154  It is noteworthy that the Commission is given a duty to 
recommend reconciliation between offenders and victims or their families 
based on an offender’s repentance and the victims’ or their families’ 
forgiveness.155 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission currently is accepting 
petitions.  It will be able to investigate all the cases that the 2000 Act for 
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing 
Compensation for Them and the 2001 Special Act for Truth-Finding of 
Suspicious Deaths did not or could not cover.  In particular, the following 
high-profile cases are being reviewed:  the case of Cho Yong-Soo, who was 
the president of a progressive newspaper, the case of Minjok Ilbo, who was 
executed after the coup of May 16, 1961,156 the case of Cho Bong-Ahm, who 
was the first Minister of Agriculture under the Rhee Syng-Man government, 
was accused of spying for North Korea, and was executed after he received 
phenomenal support from the public as a social democrat presidential 
candidate of the opposition party in the 1956 presidential election,157 and a 
number of unlawful killings of civilians by either the South or North Korean 
government or by either pro-South militia or pro-North partisans from 
August 15, 1945, to the end of the Korean War.  It was reported that 86.7% 
of the petitions to the Comission were about such unlawful killing cases.158 
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Presently, it is too early to anticipate how the activities of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission will go on.  The Commission is expected to 
face difficult challenges since the Commission’s jurisdiction is very broad, 
the incidents in question occurred so long ago, and political parties are likely 
to make use of the lustration of the past wrongs for their political aims. 
VII. CONCLUSION—CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE THROUGH LOOKING BACK 
TO THE PAST 
For nearly a decade, the Korean people have chosen to pursue national 
reconciliation and unity through disclosing truths and achieving justice 
instead of forgetting the past.  With strong pressure from civil society, the 
Legislature, the Judiciary, and several committees and commissions have 
played their own unique roles to rectify past wrongs and reevaluate the past. 
The Korean way of dealing with past wrongs may be summarized as 
follows:  (1) retroactive criminal sanction is limited to the core perpetrators 
who acted under the authoritarian regime; (2) retroactive civil sanction is 
given broadly to the victims of the authoritarian rule; (3) the contribution by 
past activists for democratization of Korea is officially recognized; (4) 
counter-violence by them is leniently examined; (5) even home-grown leftist 
movements are embraced despite the current ideological and military tension 
between two Koreas; and (6) uncovering past wrongs without criminal 
sanction is extended beyond the period of the authoritarian regime to include 
the Japanese Occupation and the Korean War. 
Illustrating past wrongs has provided for a new political and social 
ground on which Korean society can make a new beginning.  With the 
broader perspective for democracy that has been established by the Special 
Acts and decisions that follow, the Korean people will be able to internalize 
their belief in democracy and move forward.  In this sense, looking back to 
their past is a way for Koreans to view and construct their future.  To cite 
E.H. Carr, history is “a dialogue between the events of the past and 
progressively emerging future ends.”159 
This process certainly has not been free from political struggle.  
Liberals initiated and propelled legislation to achieve the task while 
conservatives were passive.  Although conservatives have criticized such 
activities to rectify past wrongs as politically biased and responsible for 
consuming too many social resources, they have come to understand the 
Special Acts as necessary to relieve the burdens they carry from the period 
of authoritarian rule.  This reflects the complicated psychology inherited by 
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the Korean people from their experience under the old regime.  They were 
not only victims of the old regime but also passive collaborators or partial 
beneficiaries. 
However, the Special Acts were forged by agreements between the 
liberal and conservative parties.  Although each side has advocated 
somewhat different methods with differing scopes for rectifying past 
wrongs, they have come together in the belief that Korean society needs to 
discard the legacy of the authoritarian regime.  In this light, the acts are 
symbolic statements that officially declare the people’s dissatisfaction with 
the authoritarian regime.  They are necessary for Koreans to heal old 
wounds, and to move beyond their tortured past. 
